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Abstract 
 
The article focuses on one of the most serious accusations brought against 
Descartes and modern philosophy, namely “the dualism of substance”. The 
accusers claim that the human body and soul were viewed as completely 
separate; consequently, their relationship as such and the united being of 
man become incomprehensible. As has been shown above, the idea of the 
separation of the soul from the body did not originate with Descartes; it was 
formulated much earlier, and repeated by a disciple of Descartes’, Henry 
Leroy, known as Regius. When Descartes became aware of this bizarre 
interpretation he was dismayed and sought to clarify the matter. He sought to 
distinguish between two terms, “distinction” and “separation” and to 
illuminate the relationship between body and soul at three different levels, 
i.e. ordinary experience, analytical mind and metaphysical meditation. 
Eventually, he embraced the paradox of the two natures – the double 
substantial make-up of the human being, a paradox of patristic inspiration. 
However, the later history of ideas was not sympathetic to Descartes: 
nowadays, when one looks up the term “metaphysical dualism” in dictionaries 
or glossaries, even in the studies of prestigious researchers, one will find 
views similar to those of the unfaithful disciple Regius. The resilience of this 
locus obscurus is explained both by the power of a new mode of interpreting 
discourse (as technical or logical analysis) and by the ever more privileged 
position of the reader (intentio lectoris). Both attitudes are related to modern 
ideologies and to changes which have occurred in the intersubjective life-
world, especially in the communication of the scholarly and academic world. 
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1.  Intersubjectivity and interpretation 
  
  I will start this article by making a relatively 
straightforward point. We are all aware that the lived space of 
subjectivity is never neutral or homogenous. Rather, it 
                                                           
* This work was supported by CNCSIS – UEFISCSU, project number PNII – 
IDEI 788 / 2010, code 2104. META: Res. in Herm., Phen., and Pract. Philosophy – II (1) / 2010 
  106 
resembles a mountain range, featuring uneven and complicated 
topology. The experiences which it comprises do not support a 
single orientation in the world of life. Indeed, some situations 
make no sense at all. Many experiences prove equivocal or 
contradictory and hard to fathom. We may point, in this 
respect, to the experience of mutual knowledge, superbly 
expounded by Hegel in Phenomenology of Spirit, where he 
mentions the “independence and dependence of self-
consciousness: lordship and bondage” (Hegel 1977, 111). 
Likewise, we can point to the experience of otherness and of the 
emergence of the other ego, a key element in Husserl’s fifth 
meditation in his Cartesian Meditations. As has been rightly 
noted, one’s understanding of the self provides a means to 
understanding the others (Sein und Zeit, § 26). Especially in 
the public milieu, there are certain inescapable deficiencies in 
one’s care for the other (which Heidegger called Fürsorge). A 
further, “dramatic function” of intersubjectivity was described, 
with unexpected results in communication (Habermas). 
Consequently, it makes sense to always consider the 
intersubjective character of interpretation. More important still 
is its rugged topography, with serious consequences in terms 
the perception of the self and of the other. By being aware of 
such situations, one may be more able to understand why 
certain interpretations, while highly debatable, manage to take 
centre stage and occasionally dominate entire eras. Moreover, 
one may perceive more easily a kind of “pathology” of 
interpretation (in the Kantian understanding of the term, 
which invokes the Greek pathos), with possible disorders and 
excesses. Although the interpretation effort aims to clarify 
certain presuppositions about the mind, others equally bizarre 
or scandalous continue to emerge. 
  I will attempt to discuss below how a famous locus 
obscurus, “the Cartesian dualism”, emerged and has remained 
prominent to this day. It can only be properly understood, I 
believe, in connection with the emergence in the modern world 
of certain modes of intersubjective life, such as communication 
in the scholarly and academic environments. To this end, I will 
call attention to one the most serious accusations levelled at 
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of substances”: the human body and soul have been understood 
as being two completely separate substances. Consequently, 
both the relationship between them and man’s lived presence 
would have become totally incomprehensible. It was claimed 
that this dualism of substances was the unmistakable symptom 
of metaphysical thought, which would possibly mean that the 
very presence of metaphysics is indicative of a serious case of 
misapprehension or deviation1. However, the very idea of 
“Cartesian dualism” may be viewed as a locus obscurus in the 
philosophical thought. It is an obscure place not only because it 
has been inadequately examined or debated. Rather because 
recent history has accepted it completely as the symbolic thesis 
of a whole tradition of thought. Therefore, it is not surprising to 
find references to “Cartesian dualism” in almost any philosophy 
dictionary, manual or encyclopaedic tome. 
I would like to make another preliminary point. We 
should recall that the old phrase locus obscurus, especially 
when it concerns a written segment, has at least three accepted 
meanings. First, it may refer to a passage or fragment not yet 
exposed or known well enough. Second, it designates something 
which is intrinsically unclear or ambiguous. Last, it frequently 
involves a meaning found in ancient religious hermeneutics: 
locus obscurus may refer to an enigmatic or secret aspect. We 
can therefore realise that the phrase had negative connotations 
only in some definite cases. 
I will focus in the beginning on a fact that must give us 
pause: the bizarre interpretation of Descartes’ writings 
continues to this day, at times with the purpose of creating 
scandal. It is a fascinating, even seductive spectacle at times. 
However, it manages to obscure two instances of interpretative 
dialogue,  intentio operis and intentio auctoris, to borrow 
Umberto Eco’s established terminology. 
 
2.  The Fauvism of certain interpretations 
 
I do not intend to catalogue all the interpretations which 
can reasonably apply to Descartes’ writings. Yet before 
examining what the “Cartesian dualism” is about, let us briefly 
look at the “Descartes phenomenon”, specifically at certain META: Res. in Herm., Phen., and Pract. Philosophy – II (1) / 2010 
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images or idols which emerged in the intersubjective space of 
interpretation.  
What became of Descartes in the 20th century, especially 
after the Second World War, seems to be a jungle of 
interpretations. Each interpretation seeks to take you on a new 
path, yet as you cannot forget about the existence of the others, 
you constantly risk being caught in a state of total confusion. 
All these interpretations compose together a landscape like 
those in equatorial areas. Long gone is the picture of the 
solitary thinker, who retired for a time to a house in the 
Netherlands, and, clothed in his dressing gown, seated at the 
fireplace, looking undecided at a blank page, reflecting alone 
and writing down for several nights, almost as a confession, 
potential answers to his long deliberations on the existence on 
anything certain in the world of knowledge. This image 
probably appears to those who feel themselves filled with 
loneliness and the sheer freedom of metaphysical thought. It is 
as though Descartes must now face the harsh retort to the 
metaphor of the tree of knowledge, which he himself used in 
one of his letters. 
Few are those who generally consider Descartes to be a 
very lucid author, among them Étienne Gilson sau Ferdinand 
Alquié and, in the post-war period, Jean-Luc Marion. Some 
have referred to a genuine French tradition of Cartesian 
hermeneutic, whose other prominent figures include Henri 
Gouhier, Jean Laporte, Martial Gueroult or, laters, Jean-Marie 
Beyssade, Nicolas Grimaldi and Geneviève Rodis-Lewis. Those 
who do make attempts at rehabilitation often do so by resorting 
to exotic or defensive approaches. They focus either on the 
ethical effects of Descartes’ thought, or on his cultural model 
and certain key ideas that the French philosopher asserted. 
Much more numerous are the authors who refer to 
Descartes with an almost fauvist freedom in their assumptions. 
They bring forth a mix of scandal and spectacle of ideas. One is 
thus able to discover a non-Cartesian Descartes, unpredictable 
and even rebellious. This marks a return to the image of the 
masked philosopher (famously asserted by Maxime Leroy) or 
that of the modern and somewhat unrestrained man (an image 
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Friedmann). To support this view, certain less speculative 
episodes in Descarte’s life are evoked, such as: a duel he fought 
over a beautiful lady, in 1625, at the age of 29; the long-
standing suspicion (originated by Voetius) that he had fathered 
several illegitimate children; a secret affair with Hélène Jans, a 
woman of means, who gave birth Francine, out of wedlock, in 
1635; certain pages in his correspondence with princess 
Elisabeth of Bohemia; but also certain bizarre confessions, such 
as the one in his letter to Chanut, of 6 June 1647, in which he 
declared that as a child he had been in love with a crossed-eye 
girl and then as an adult he had a long-lasting attraction for 
women with this natural condition. 
A recurrent picture is that of the indexed heretic, as it is 
a well-known fact that in 1667, king Louis XIV outlawed the 
teaching of Cartesian philosophy. Descartes’ writings had 
already been indexed since 1663. Bossuet, in a 1687 letter to 
D’Allemans, Malebranche’s disciple, described the danger posed 
by Cartesianism to the Christian teaching of those times. 
V o e t i u s ,  L e  M a i s t r e  d e  S a c y  a n d  D u  V a n c e l  h a d  s i m i l a r  
reactions. As noted by Baillet, Descartes’ biographer, Voetius 
was very rigorous and exact in his claims, listing seven points 
of profound disagreement between Cartesianism and 
Christianity: “This philosophy is dangerous, favourable to 
scepticism, apt to destroy our belief concerning the reasonable 
soul, the procession of divine persons in the Trinity, the 
Incarnation of Jesus Christ, original sin, miracles, prophecies” 
(Baillet 1691, 146). Even though Voetius might have been right 
in a historical or dogmatic sense, in his reaction he should have 
heeded the advice of the one who offered the parable of the good 
Samaritan. Denunciations similar to that delivered by Voetius’ 
exist to this day, however far more numerous are those who 
turn the heresy accusation into an encomium to a free mind. 
There is a short distance separating the heretic from the 
radical thinker, one who, according to Paul Valéry experiments 
continuously, in an almost aesthetic manner, and risks 
everything in the exercise of doubt. This Descartes, in this 
rather avant-garde guise, would thus be considered an 
inspiration for the art of Matisse and Cézanne, as through the 
test of the limits of doubt he leaped in the space of absolute META: Res. in Herm., Phen., and Pract. Philosophy – II (1) / 2010 
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solitude. 
Very often one can also find the image of a divided 
Descartes, violently at odds with himself. He appears as 
perfectly baroque (Rosario Assunto), esoteric or Rosicrucian 
(F.A. Yates), analytical (Jean Laporte), Christian (Le Senne) 
yet atheist (Sartre), canonical theologist (Gilson) and secular 
theologian (Jonas), free-thinking metaphysician (Ortega y 
Gasset), legitimiser of past phalocentric eras (Susan Bardo) but 
egalitarian with regard to gender issues (Stanley Clarke), 
modern (Habermas) yet scholastic (J.-Fr. Courtine), liberal 
(Alain) but also conservative (Fr. von Hayek), empiricist 
(Laporte) but no less a spiritualist (Cousin) and rigorous to the 
extreme (Steven Gaukroger), yet with an almost poetical 
audacity, especially in how he himself interpreted his bizarre 
dream of November 1619 (Mallarmé). “Descartes has been 
presented to us, in equal measure, as champion of the apostolic 
and roman Church, a Huguenot, wearing a mask and 
consciously putting on a show, mysticist and Rosicrucian, an 
agent of secret societies, a revolutionary and advocate of 
burgeois order. To some, he is the epitome of Western 
intelligence; to others, he is a pedantic thinker who knows 
everything, and nothing else, a defender of simple wisdom, but 
the most imbecile of rationalists, a destroyer of the arts and 
poetry and the main culprit for the dissolution of our culture. A 
commentator for each of guises of Descartes-Proteus’” (Frédérix 
1959, 9). Perhaps on a map of critical attitudes in modern 
Europe few areas have been left uncharted by the interpreters 
of the French philosopher. 
The conservative picture of Descartes - in epistemology 
(Bachelard), and subsequently in the archaeology of power 
(Foucault) or even in metaphysics (Rorty) – is matched against 
the perfectly equivocal (Derrida) or even the revolutionary 
Descartes who proclaims liberty as the foundation of being 
(Sartre). The former metaphysician thus becomes a 
revolutionary that precedes all revolutions. In his analysis, 
Sartre recalls the ideologists of 1789, who celebrated Descartes 
as a covert materialist, a genuine progressive and a liberator of 
the human mind. This image is reminiscent of late echoes of the 
German Ideology or the writings of disciples who upheld the Ştefan Afloroaei / Descartes and the “metaphysical dualism”  
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notion of the exalted history of the deprived. 
The rebellious Descartes, for he is one too, is not only 
French. He appears as an embodiment of American spirit 
(Pierre Nzinzi), or Dutch (a free Protesant, according to Kojève), 
a Western Slav (assures Merab Mamardachvili, in his 
Cartesian Meditations, 1981), or even an Islamist (S. Mosbah), 
a post-modern, therefore a post-Cartesian (F. Frimat). 
Descartes himself would suggest a going beyond Cartesianism, 
whereas others failed to do the same with regards to their own 
doctrine (Jacques D’Hondt). He would recommend searching for 
other moral norms, which could be connected with the 
manipulation of the human body and the process of 
development on a global scale, with the possibility of giving in 
to virtual worlds or even with individual and cultural 
minorities’ rights. 
Still other interpreters made truly appalling claims. 
They had their own motives for discovering in Descartes’ 
writings the source of terrible future historical troubles. They 
would consider him a precursor of totalitarian thought (Karl R. 
Popper) a master who legitimised domination over people and 
objects (André Glucksmann). He contributed allegedly to the 
establishment of a tyranny of reason (Jean-Marie Benoit), 
which would be possible based on the modern interpretation 
paradigm (Richard Rorty). 
There is a visible reaction to the post-modern views of 
Descartes. Thus, Jean-Luc Marion, one of the most exacting 
researchers of his works, identified the positive scholastic mind 
and their theological inspiration2. Later, Steven Gaukroger 
demanded that all researchers of Descartes should make a 
decisive return to the 17th-century scientific context, the only 
one which could explain the emergence of this scholar 
(Gaukroger 2000, 4-6). Others, such as Ioan P. Couliano, would 
always debate the images of Bacon, Descartes, Galileo and 
others which were created by late 18th-century ideologists. 
Beyond all these images, Descartes has remained for most a 
classical metaphysician (Couliano 1987, 179-191). After 
Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, he is the one thinker who 
created a genuine European metaphysical tradition. In the 
modern world, only the Kantian tradition would be comparable META: Res. in Herm., Phen., and Pract. Philosophy – II (1) / 2010 
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– and obviously competing – with the Cartesian tradition.  
However, Descartes is the prerequisite reference when 
one debates “metaphysical dualism” today: allegedly he 
generated this affliction. Pierre Mesnard, a thorough researcher 
of Cartesian philosophy, observed “Descartes still remains to 
Aristotelians the man of absolute distinctions and of the 
impossible synthesis, the only one who is forbidden to make 
distinctions to create unity” (Mesnard 1937, 156). It is an 
important remark, as usually modern Aristotelians have 
perceived Cartesian ontology as perfectly dualist and brutally 
fractured at its very foundation. 
 
3. A prejudice of historical proportions: “Cartesian 
dualism” 
 
Unaware that he would provide fodder for centuries of 
controversies, Descartes declared that a proper distinction must 
be drawn between body and soul before attempting anything 
else. Only by achieving a proper understanding of what we call 
“the self” or the “I”, could we obtain the knowledge of other 
important matters, for example whether mathematical truths 
can be questions, whether fear of death is justified, whether it 
is good to prevent the suffering of the other and whether we 
should believe in the effective presence of the divine power. 
Descartes was to dedicate a whole book, probably his most 
important, to this issue: the distinction between mind and body. 
The work in question is Meditationes de prima philosophia, in 
qua de existentia et animae humane a corpore distinctio 
demonstratur, edited in 1639-1640, with the final title 
Meditationes de prima philosophia, in qua de existentia et 
animae immortalitatis demonstratur, Amsterdam, 1642, 
accompanied by seven series of objections and answers. Most of 
those who invoke this book assert that Descartes described in it 
the human body and soul as two completely separate 
substances: res extensa and res cogitans. Thus, modern Europe 
allegedly imposed an incomprehensible representation of the 
two substances, an inflexible dualism, which so far we have not 
been able to discard. Consequently, we might not actually be 
able to understand ourselves.  Ştefan Afloroaei / Descartes and the “metaphysical dualism”  
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Yet how did we end up this way, so critical of Cartesian 
metaphysics? Was Descartes unaware of this interpretation of 
his writings? 
It all began with his closest disciple, Regius (Henry 
Leroy), who insisted on the separation of mind and body, 
believing that was his master’s own claim3. Relying on this 
conviction, Regius seriously troubled the waters of metaphysics 
and defined the human being as an „ens per accidens” 
(Descartes 1991, 200; Adam and Tannery III, 460). Unaware 
that he was an infidel and heretic, Regius translated on his own 
some of Descartes’ ideas and stated that, according to 
Descartes, man is an accidental entity, ens per accidentem. In 
other words, the union of body and soul of this being is 
accidental or occasional. For an accidental entity, the meeting 
of body and soul occurs only at irregular and undetermined 
times. We must admit that this is quite a spectacular idea, 
beyond its metaphysical scandal. Claiming that man is a 
contingently composed being is bound to draw anyone’s 
attention. Thus the view of man’s contingent being emerged 
well before the 20th-century exaltation of facticity or man’s 
absurd situation. All it required was the bold interpretation by 
a disciple, who referred to Greek metaphysics. 
I would like to make a side comment at this point. One can find 
a lot about the accidental being in Aristotle’s writings. For 
example, in Metaphysics,  V, 1025, he writes that we call 
accidental “what holds good of something and is true to say, but 
neither of necessity nor for the most part.” (Aristotle 1993, 64). 
The examples which the philosopher provides are eloquent: 
finding a treasure when digging a hole for another purpose, 
being a learned person or being white. “There is thus no 
definite cause of [the accident], but a chance one, and that is 
indefinite. It was a coincidence for someone to visit Aegina if he 
went there not in order to visit but having been for off course by 
a storm or captured by pirates.” (Aristotle 1993, 65).  
If we were to refer back to the Greek philosopher’s 
assertions, but based on Regius’ own interpretation, then we 
could believe that the body and soul end up composing a human 
being not because it would be necessary, but because, while 
floating through the ether, as mere entities, the fortuitous game META: Res. in Herm., Phen., and Pract. Philosophy – II (1) / 2010 
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of some powers would cause them to meet and to compose a 
single entity, man himself. 
 
4. Descartes’ response and some of his arguments  
 
Yet did Descartes make the claim that man’s soul and 
body, as substances, are actually separate? A careful reading of 
his demonstrates that this is not the case. We do know that the 
philosopher laid great emphasis in his early writings, until 
around 1640, on the distinction of mind and body. Therefore, 
distinction, not separation, as the philosopher himself would 
stress. The relevant works are: Traité du Monde ou de la 
Lumière, written in 1633, Discours de la Méthode, published at 
Leyda in 1637, and Meditationes de prima philosophia. In 
Traité du Monde ou de la Lumière there is an attempt at 
understanding the communication between soul and body, yet 
the soul Descartes refers to is specifically the sensitive soul, if 
we accept a tentative Platonic distinction. 
Something truly extraordinary occurred afterwards. 
Descartes would focus mainly on the intimate relation of the 
soul and body, and on their living union. It is hard to tell 
exactly what caused this visible shift of focus. It could have 
been due to some of the objections he faced after he wrote 
Meditationes de prima philosophia. Copies of the work were 
sent to Mersenne, Caterus and others. Certain objections, such 
as those made by Antoine Arnauld, emphasised the point that 
Descartes excessively separated man’s soul from his body. He 
was even accused of angelism, because he claimed that 
essential for man was only his rational soul, while his body was 
a mere vehicle of the soul. Supposedly he endorsed the 
definition:  hominem esse solum animum utentem corpore, 
meaning that man is the soul himself which makes use of a 
body (Adam and Tannery VII, 227). Such interpretations drew 
further objections, which troubled Descartes. Some where truly 
bizarre, picturing man as the soul of an angel sheltered in a 
body, or as a pure mind in a material vehicle. Descartes would 
openly express his annoyance and intention to respond. We will 
present below some of his case against these interpretations. 
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The pain of man is not a mere notion. If the soul 
were separate from the body, Descartes claimed, then pain 
would only be a thought of the soul. Thus it could only be 
perceived by the mind, without man actually feeling it. “For if 
an angel were in a human body, he would not have sensations 
as we do, but would simply perceive the motions which are 
caused by external objects, and in this way would differ from a 
real man” (Descartes 1991, 206; Adam and Tannery III, 460). 
Indeed, the pain that we feel certainly means more than that. It 
represents rather “the confused perception of a mind really 
united to a body” (Descartes 1991, 206; Adam and Tannery III, 
460). The same applies to sorrow or joy, hunger or thirst etc. 
Descartes focuses on certain specific cases for his era, such as 
the illusions of those who had an amputated limb 
(Meditationes, VI) or the pain felt in a phantom limb (Letter to 
Fromondus, 3 October 1637). He demonstrates that the 
mutilation of one part of the body does not change the latter’s 
original union with the soul. 
One cannot conceive of the mind and body in terms of a 
simple analogy, such as that of a sailor on some ship 
(Meditationes, VI): “I am not merely present in my body as a 
sailor is present in a ship, but that I am very closely joined, 
and, as it were, intermingled with it, so that I and the body 
form a unit. If this were not so, I, who am nothing but a 
thinking thing, would not feel pain when the body was hurt, but 
would perceive the damage purely by the intellect, just as a 
sailor perceives by sight if anything in his ship is broken" 
(Descartes 1996, 56; Adam and Tannery VII, 81). If the soul 
were like a sailor, and the body of man like the ship that the 
sailor commands on waters at will, then the soul would be able 
to perceive the soul’s state only with his mind. Moreover, if at 
one point he felt he was suffering from a serious disease, he 
could simply leave the body, and take refuge far away, as the 
sailor does when he abandons a sinking ship save his life. 
The misunderstanding concealed by such an analogy 
causes Descartes to regularly address and emphasise the idea 
that the man’s soul, although distinct in substance, is 
nevertheless truly united with his living body. 
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Passions are troubles that are born of the mutual 
relationship between body and soul. I believe that in 
supporting this idea, the philosopher was particularly 
stimulated by the numerous asked in numerous letters by 
Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia. The princess’s quite unusual 
interests – the Latin language, theories of mathematics and 
cosmology, and certain disputes in metaphysics at the time – 
stimulated this exchange of correspondence. A further 
inspiration could have been the moments of sadness or 
despondency which she regularly and quite seriously 
experienced. There might have been other reasons, unknown to 
outsiders. 
 In 1642, Regius encouraged Princess Elisabeth to ask 
Descartes to clarify certain matters concerning her emotional 
state. Descartes thus came to know her, would grow to cherish 
her greatly and the two of them would engage in extensive 
correspondence (Foucher de Careil 1879). In July 1644, he 
dedicated to her his book Principia Philosophiae, written in 
Latin. The first lines in the “Epistola Dedicatoria” seem to 
express an almost pure form of love: “The greatest advantage I 
have derived from the writings which I have already published, 
has arisen from my having, through means of them, become 
known to your Highness, and thus been privileged to hold 
occasional conversations […]” (Adam and Tannery VIII, 1). In 
one of the letters, he told her that in Meditationes he briefly 
referred to the union of the soul and body (28 June 1643). This 
was due to the fact that the book dealt with metaphysics and 
therefore focused particularly on the use of pure intellect, which 
seeks to distinguish things with maximum attention, and 
thereby achieve a clear view of the self. As for the idea of the 
union of body and soul, it seems to be more clearly realised 
through the senses than through pure intellect or imagination. 
Based on this exchange of letters and responding to the wish of 
the princess, Descartes penned a rather unexpected book the 
treatise on The Passions of the Soul, written in 1645 – 1646, 
and published later, in 1649. In stark contrast to Descartes’ 
disciple, Regius, the princess constantly invoked the union of 
the soul and body. She did it for several reasons, one of which 
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always serve me as the antidote to melancholy” (Elisabeth of 
Bohemia 2007, 93; Adam and Tannery IV, 233). In this 
particular work, the living communication of soul and body is 
viewed in terms of the typical human passions and aspirations. 
The two natures that compose us, the rational and the 
corporeal, affect each other profoundly, although it is difficult to 
express this relationship as a concept. Likewise for the three 
functions of the soul which ancient authors referred to: the 
vegetative, the sensitive and the rational function respectively4. 
When relating to the world of passions, the mind 
undergoes a certain transformation. Descartes himself 
confessed about it, in a letter to the Marquess of Newcastle 
(April 1648): “The philosophy I cultivate is not so savage or 
grim as to outlaw the operation of the passions; on the contrary, 
it is here, in my view, that the entire sweetness and joy of life is 
to be found” (Adam et Tannery V, 135). Likewise, the real union 
of body and soul differs from a mere exchange of energy 
between the two entities. This unity takes on the name of 
human life itself and is perceived as a feature of this life. It 
constitutes a different term from the previous two already 
designated as substances. In a letter to princess Elisabeth, from 
21 May 1643, Descartes referred to these three preliminary 
notions, viewed as patterns for all the other representations: 
“Then, as regards body in particular, we have only the notion of 
extension, which entails the notions of shape and motion; and 
as regards the soul on its own, we have only the notion of 
thought, which includes the perceptions of the intellect and the 
inclinations of the will. Lastly, as regards the soul and the body 
together, we have only the notion of their union, on which 
depends our notion of the soul's power to move the body, and 
the body's power to act on the soul and cause its sensations and 
passion” (Descartes 1991, 218; Adam and Tannery III, 665). 
This would lead to a multitude of questions over time: how is it 
possible for the two substances to communicate effectively, and 
moreover, to join together in creating a third notion, life itself? 
How is the union between the two substances made possible? 
Nevertheless Descartes constantly asserted this view5. The 
Aristotelian logic identified an incomprehensible or even utterly 
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emerges from his letters and his replies to objections. 
When Descartes discusses the intimate union of the 
body and soul, he refers to the real being of man, as it becomes 
the actual site of communication between the “two substances”, 
intellectual and corporeal. 
 
The obvious case of melancholy. In Descartes’ 
correspondence with princess Elisabeth of Bohemia there are 
recurrent discussions about melancholy, perceived as a malady 
of the soul, at once noble and terrifying. The princess herself 
was afflicted by melancholy, and the regular attacks caused her 
to be quite concerned at times. She confessed about it to 
Descartes and their exchanges focused on the relationship 
between mind and body in the occurrence of this malady. As 
has been noted, the princess was surprised especially that 
“passions and bodily imperfections can obscure the mind and 
that even the highest and most obvious philosophical precepts 
cannot bring peace to a soul ravaged by the trivial disturbances 
of day-to-day life” (Brătescu  1984, 9). Descartes knew this 
condition well from the medical treatises of his era and believed 
that it might have been linked to madness itself (Mesnard 1995, 
427-447). He wrote about melancholy and its relationship with 
the “vapours” discharged by the black bile in the first 
Meditation and in La recherche de la vérité, an incomplete 
dialogue. 
More recent exegesis has also taken a different path, 
claiming that Descartes himself was affected by the condition. 
The texts collected in Olympica, about his three dreams of 
November 1619, as he stayed at Neuburg, on the shores of the 
river Danube, have provided arguments for claims that his 
solitude was linked to a state of melancholy (Mesnard  1995, 
433). The third dream in particular is amenable to such an 
interpretation. In fact, Descartes himself greatly emphasised 
the role which imagination plays in moments of solitude and 
inspiration. He would notice a kind of alternation of states of 
enthusiasm and depression, or of inspiration and laziness. 
Indeed, such an alternation is typical of the melancholic 
disposition (Klibansky, Panofsky and Saxl 1964, part one, II, 2 
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enough reasons to seriously consider the condition which 
affected the palatine princess. Furthermore, for the 
metaphysician behind these exchanges and confessions, 
melancholy provided additional proof for the intimate union 
between the human body and soul. 
  
Only by using our lived experience one learns to 
conceive the union of the soul and the body. This is an 
unexpected view of Descartes, that it is in our daily life that we 
can particularly see the union of the two. With each sorrow or 
joy, with the ailments that affect us, in pain and in insomnia, 
when we love and when we hate, we can notice that our soul 
and body participate in what happens to us. One could infer, 
based on all these facts, that there is a minimal difference 
between the two, that the soul is bound in all its acts by the 
actual life of the flesh. Yet we do know that much of what 
appears to us in a particular way in our daily life eventually 
proves to be inaccurate. Therefore, those who seek to find what 
exactly could be considered to be the truth, take the opposite 
path to that of ordinary thought and reject whatever is 
questionable: “I thought it necessary that I do exactly the 
opposite, and that I reject as absolutely false everything in 
which I could imagine the least doubt”, he announces at the 
beginning of the Part Four of Discourse on Method (Descartes 
2000a, 60; Adam and Tannery VI, 31). Therefore, at times it is 
necessary to use an opposite approach to that used previously. 
In the letter to princess Elisabeth, of 28 june 1643, he 
made a distinction between the exercise of the mind, 
imagination and sensitive perception: “First of all then, I 
observe one great difference between these three kinds of 
notions. The soul is conceived only by the pure intellect; body 
(i.e. extension, shapes and motions) can likewise be known by 
the intellect alone, but much better by the intellect aided by the 
imagination; and finally what belongs to the union of the soul 
and the body is known only obscurely by the intellect alone or 
even by the intellect aided by the imagination, but it is known 
very clearly by the senses. That is why people who never 
philosophize and use only their senses have no doubt that the 
soul moves the body and that the body acts on the soul. They META: Res. in Herm., Phen., and Pract. Philosophy – II (1) / 2010 
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regard both of them as a single thing, that is to say, they 
conceive their union; because to conceive the union between two 
things is to conceive them as one single thing. Metaphysical 
thoughts, which exercise the pure intellect, help to familiarize 
us with the notion of the soul; and the study of mathematics, 
which exercises mainly the imagination in the consideration of 
shapes and motions, accustoms us to form very distinct notions 
of body. But it is the ordinary course of life and conversation, 
and abstention from meditation and from the study of the 
things which exercise the imagination, that teaches us how to 
conceive the union of the soul and the body.” (Descartes 1991, 
226-227; Adam and Tannery III 691-692). Of course, Descartes 
does not allude to the exclusive reliance on pure intellect, on 
the one hand, or the imagination and the senses, on the other. 
Descartes knew very well that they could not be separated as 
mere faculties. However, there are certain cases when the force 
of only one of these faculties is most relevant and so is their 
individual capacity to reflect everything according to their 
particular language. 
 
The distinction under consideration refers to the 
“rational soul”. From the above we can realise that Descartes 
pays particular attention to the difference between the soul and 
the mind. The terms anima and animus, although sometimes 
reproduced in French as âme, as is the term spiritus, allow such 
a distinction. However, Descartes is ultimately interested in the 
union of the soul and the body. He accepts the idea that it is the 
mind which mediates this union. When he proclaims the clear 
distinction between soul and body, he refers to the soul which is 
able to reflect, ratio, not to anima, because even animals are 
endowed with anima. 
The argument is presented in brief in the final 
paragraph of Discourse, V, where Descartes discusses the 
radical difference between the human soul and the animal soul. 
The former has a higher, rational instance, whereas the latter 
is only sensitive. The two orders of life, rational and corporeal, 
are delimited based on this view. Bodily functions (digestion, 
locomotion, breathing, and even the memory of the flesh or 
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commanded by nature. They do not presuppose, as claimed by 
the Aristotelian tradition, a hidden soul which keeps the body 
alive and directs all its motions towards a specific goal. The 
metaphor of the clock or of the perfect machine becomes 
relevant at this point. Further, the nature of the body will be 
discussed in terms of extension, sensitive shape, motion and 
temporal succession, terms which are almost irrelevant to the 
act of thinking.  
Ultimately, the functioning of the body itself explains 
certain particular states and movements for which it was made 
(Passions of the Soul, article V). The more bizarre phrase 
“animal spirit”, originating in the Antiquity, indicates that 
which is corporeal and minute, like the subtle particles of a 
flame (article X). What is the value therefore of the ancient 
assumptions which describe the soul as a subtle breath which 
animates the machine of the body and all its movements at all 
times? 
Descartes has solid evidence to defend the difference in 
nature between soul and body. We have already highlighted 
several cases which he invokes in support of his idea. There are 
others still, for example the presence of those illusions and 
delusions which appear to us, as they are produced by the 
senses, by our imagination or due to certain conditions. One 
such illusion concerns the movement of stars in the sky. Man 
can however observe with much detachment what goes on in 
the vast world of existing things. He can thus notice that 
certain phenomena or movements are only apparent, although 
he often thinks they are true. He faces a more peculiar form of 
reality, one which is constantly shaped by appearances too. As a 
detached observer, man watches the spectacle of the world 
which is like an immense theatre (Afloroaei 1998, 30-40; 
Mesnard 2005). He comes to see himself as being removed from 
the real, sensitive world. For that brief moment, man is 
identified with his rational soul, which is capable of speculative 
thought.  
 
The idea of “separation” may be understood as a 
supreme form of freedom of certain spiritual acts. There 
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the act of understanding, desiring, believing, willing, perceiving 
etc. Although they create an inseparable whole, some of these 
acts tend towards an extreme form of freedom. For example, 
memory and contemplation tend to become pure and 
unconditional to a certain extent, as if they only relied on 
anima rationalis (Adam et Tannery III, 371). Certain passions 
too, such as those which accompany the contemplation of idea, 
involve a form of purity. This is what causes the mind to be less 
affected by the passing of time, at least in certain situations. 
One could believe therefore that it continues to exist when all 
other things have ceased to exist. The body however – corpus 
physicum and not corpus gloriae – is defined by extension, 
which entails the notions of shape, time and motion. The whole 
it creates is divisible and also evolving and subject to the 
passing of time (Meditationes, VI). 
Ultimately, as Descartes declares, rational approaches 
do not lead to the belief that the soul is subject to time or death 
as the body is. Nowadays this idea can seem strange, yet for the 
era Descartes wrote it for it was a serious matter.  
Could we, however, accept a mode of the mind which is 
absolutely free from the bodily life? Does this occur through 
what we call death? In case the answer is positive, then we 
ought to refer again to religious experience, as Descartes 
himself does in the same meditation. However those who 
cannot invoke the divine power will have to reject everything as 
being nothing but speculation. Or to claim a mere logical 
possibility, a possible area on an imaginary map of mind games. 
Indeed, what definite proof do we have against this possible 
situation? As is plain to see, this issue cannot be decided by 
science, and is impossible to ignore metaphysically and 
inexhaustible from a religious point of view.  
 
5. The paradox of the two natures 
 
Alongside the arguments listed above, Descartes’ answer 
features a particularly distinct element, namely the acceptance 
of a very common paradox in the patristic literature. 
As we lead our simple lives, removed from more 
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form a single being. In fact, there is nothing strange about this 
situation; everything is relatively as it should be, in a kind of 
extended natural agreement. We cannot therefore notice any 
serious fractures in man’s being or any hidden conflicts that 
might overturn our self-image. Yet if we were to censure our 
initial perception, that is if we acted, even temporarily as 
sceptics do, we would be faced with a different image. Whatever 
seemed orderly and peaceful in our daily life up until then 
would suddenly become scandalous. Paradox thus emerges and 
forces us to accept it unquestioningly. 
In the letter to Princess Elisabeth of 28 June 1643, 
Descartes clearly asserts this: “I think it was those meditations 
rather than thoughts requiring less attention that have made 
Your Highness find obscurity in the notion we have of the union 
of the mind and the body. It does not seem to me that the 
human mind is capable of forming a very distinct conception of 
both the distinction between the soul and the body and their 
union; for to do this it is necessary to conceive them as a single 
thing and at the same time to conceive them as two things; and 
this is absurd.” (Descartes 1991, 227; Adam and Tannery III, 
693). These are indeed extraordinary remarks, which Descartes 
apparently made in passing and without any precautions. First, 
he tells the distinguished princess that philosophical 
meditation is not a way to clarify certain ideas and find peace. 
Rather, such meditation, due to the attention it requires, can 
lead to further obscurity. It contributes to unveiling other 
obscured things or changes the way we see things which have 
hitherto seemed rather clear. Then, the confessor makes a 
surprising comment, i.e. “the human mind is [incapable] of 
forming a very distinct conception of both the distinction 
between the soul and the body and their union”. We will see 
later on that Descartes does not rely on simple rhetoric when 
making this claim. Indeed, to distinguish completely between 
the mind and the body and also to see their perfect unity is 
rather typical of theology. Taking this further, the issue 
appears to belong to a revealed teaching with eschatological 
aims. Finally, Descartes observes a paradox which philosophy 
cannot escape: that it is necessary that we conceive the soul and 
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things”, being aware that the two perspectives are contrary to 
each other. 
Descartes proposes a few distinct steps in understanding 
the relationship between the mind and the body. There are 
three angles from which the relationship can be examined, i.e. 
of ordinary experience, of analytical mind and of metaphysics. 
We will make a few comments about each below. 
Descartes states that if we rely on our daily experience 
we will easily notice that the soul and body are in an 
unmediated union. We therefore give considerable credit to 
sensory perceptions. The convenient reliance on the senses and 
the imagination can at times make us believe that the soul is 
actually corporeal (Adam and Tannery III, 666). Yet this does 
not mean that we will have been gravely mistaken in doing so; 
there are many situations when daily facts are founded on our 
actions. It is also possible for us to distinguish the difference 
between the two, as when we focus on what happened in a 
dream or in the case of certain medical conditions, visions, etc. 
Nevertheless, at this stage, their union and constant 
cooperation will appear certain to us. 
As we step beyond the borders of daily experience, we 
can observe that the mind and the body are actually radically 
different. Their concepts themselves are distinct, as if they 
belonged to two separate worlds. This is the conclusion we are 
directed to by the pure intellect (the speculative thought, as 
Descartes calls it). To distinguish between the mind and the 
body is, for Descartes, a kind of obligation for speculative 
thought, in the positive sense of the word. It refers to what 
thought can experience itself: “we can conclude that two 
substances are really distinct one from the other from the sole 
fact that we can clearly and distinctly understand the one 
without the other” (Descartes 2000, § 60, 247; Adam and 
Tannery VIIIa, 28). They appear to the mind as some “primitive 
notions which are as it were the patterns on the basis of which 
we form all our other conceptions” (Descartes 1991, 218; Adam 
and Tannery III, 665). Strictly speaking, the mind and the body 
can be conceived distinctly. This happens not only because our 
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eventually, but in a more profound sense, that is they emerge 
as such because of their nature. 
A third natural step is possible in discussing this 
matter, beyond the clarity of the distinction between the body 
and the soul. What could motivate us to take this final step? 
Although two distinct concepts, the mind and the body 
constantly act upon each other and only together do they 
compose man’s real life. It is a claim that other metaphysicians, 
such as Spinoza and Leibniz, could not accept6. In a letter to 
Arnauld, of 29 July 1648, Descartes notes that the soul, 
although incorporeal, constantly acts upon the body, yet neither 
reasoning nor comparison with anything else could elucidate 
how this occurs. Certain obvious experiences in daily life do 
prove this fact. It is known to us mostly due to the senses. Yet it 
becomes obscure when we seek to understand it rationally. A 
few years earlier, on 28 June 1643, in a letter to Princess 
Elisabeth, he would dwell on the same issue. 
I would like to draw a first conclusion at this point. 
There are two basic facts, the truth of ordinary experience (the 
soul and the body form a single thing, a single living being) and 
the truth of pure thought (the soul and the body are radically 
different substances). This does not entail that the second truth 
cancels out the first, only that it accompanies it on another 
level. In relation to these truths, metaphysical reflection 
focuses on a third: although radically distinct, the soul and the 
body are intimately and inseparably united in man’s being. 
This is the point reached for the moment by the Cartesian 
meditation. Again, this is a speculative conclusion, yet at a 
different level than the intellect. Descartes observes, as did the 
ancient sceptics, that the truth he may hold at a particular 
point in time must not be accepted outright. He then realises 
the need to reverse the original conditions, which causes 
thought to operate in a kind of inverted world (as Hegel would 
call it). We also know that Bergson later defined to 
philosophical reflection as a reversal of the habitual 
intelligence. 
As we can observe, the conceptual exercise describes not 
only the distinction between the two substances but also their 
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one better understand how they exist in real union. His reply to 
Antoine Arnauld, to the fourth series of objections, is 
illuminating in this respect: “Nor do I see why this argument 
'proves too much' [...] Also I thought I was very careful to guard 
against anyone inferring from this that man was simply 'a soul 
which makes use of a body’. For in the Sixth Meditation, where 
I dealt with the distinction between the mind and the body, I 
also proved at the same time that the mind is substantially 
united with the body. And the arguments which I used to prove 
this are as strong as any I can remember ever heaving read. 
Now someone who says that a man's arm is a substance that is 
really distinct from the rest of his body does not thereby deny 
that the arm belongs to the nature of the whole man. And 
saying that the arm belongs to the nature of the whole man 
does not give rise to the suspicion that it cannot subsist in its 
own right. In the same way, I do not think I proved too much in 
showing that the mind can exist apart from the body. Nor do I 
think I proved too little in saying that the mind is substantially 
united with the body, since that substantial union does not 
prevent our having a clear and distinct concept of the mind on 
its own, as a complete thing.” (Descartes 1984, 160; Adam and 
Tannery VII, 227).. The paradox is thus unavoidable: the “mind 
can exist without the body” and nevertheless “the mind is 
substantially united to the body”. The two facts that make up 
the real being of man are in equal measure radically distinct 
and substantially united. 
One must admire the way Descartes approached such a 
fraught issue in metaphysics. He debates the relationship of the 
soul and the body as perfectly paradoxical: one can affirm both 
their substantial separation and their real union. The paradox 
builds on three levels: of ordinary experience, of metaphysical 
thought and of religious meditation. It achieves maximum 
power if we consider simultaneously the three perspectives 
listed here. Thus, the thinking soul and the living body are 
essentially distinct, yet inseparable in reality. They are distinct 
in nature, yet united in their concrete reality. They are 
separated in concept but perfectly unite as real forces. Their 
fusion most often takes the shape of passions. Each is projected 
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itself, just as an image cannot completely substitute the 
imagined thing. One could establish a minimal analogy 
between this double constitution of man, as described by the 
philosopher, and the two natures of the incarnate Logos. 
Descartes suggests, essentially, that we will not find certain 
arguments through reason for their total union and complete 
separation. 
 
  6. Religious sources of the two-nature paradox 
  
Does Descartes dwell too extensively on purely 
conceptual matters, that is, those which only highlight the 
mind-body distinction? If we were to believe a confession he 
made to Princess Elisabeth, in the letter of 28 June 1643, the 
answer is negative: “the chief rule I have always observed in my 
studies, which I think has been the most useful to me in 
acquiring what knowledge I have, has been never to spend more 
than a few hours a day in the thoughts which occupy the 
imagination and a few hours a year on those which occupy the 
intellect alone. I have given all the rest of my time to the 
relaxation of the senses and the repose of the mind” (Descartes 
1991, 227; Adam and Tannery III, 692-693). Quite an 
unexpected confession! 
Those who are ready to go further, to examine the 
matter from a religious point of view, will find the truths 
presented above, in a different version. In fact, Descartes 
declares, in a letter to Mersenne on 31 December 1640, that one 
could not prove that the soul is distinct from the body before 
proving the existence of God (Adam and Tannery III, 272). He 
resorted, in this respect, to arguments pertaining to psychologia 
rationalis, as in Discourse, V: “On the other hand, when one 
knows how different they are [the soul of men and the soul of 
beasts], one understands much better the arguments which 
prove that our soul is of a nature entirely independent of the 
body, and consequently that it is not subject to die with it. 
Then, since we do not see any other causes at all for its 
destruction, we are naturally led to judge from this that it is 
immortal”(Descartes 2000a, 73; Adam and Tannery VI, 59-60). 
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– a distinct form of atemporality. 
Other arguments include those related to man’s personal 
relationship with the divine will. Indeed, mystical experience 
re-establishes, on a level that is difficult to attain, the complete 
union of the mind and the body and their intimate agreement to 
such an extent that reactions seem to coincide completely. I do 
not know whether it would be appropriate to quote here from 
the writings of authors who lived around the same time as our 
philosopher, such as Jakob Böhme and Angelus Silesius. I am 
certain that some of us will be quite sceptical of these examples, 
even though, in time and space, it is a truly decisive experience 
that man can have. 
 If it is true, as stated by his biographers, that Descartes’ 
final words invoked the soul’s free and solitary journey beyond 
that moment (“Now my soul ‘tis time to depart”), we will 
understand that the philosopher did not abandon as a mere 
intellectual problem the joining of the human body and soul 
into a single being and their separation from this life.  
Does this not revive, although in slightly modified form, 
a well-known issue to scholars of the early patristic centuries? I 
believe it does, especially as the paradox of the two natures, 
mentioned earlier, was perfectly reflected in the Christological 
disputes of the patristic era. In important writing on gnosis in 
the European area makes a relevant comment to this end: “It 
was not for nothing that St. Jerome declared: ‘the word 
hypostasis is the poison of faith’ (Epistle XV ad Damasum). The 
word’s vague meaning of nature, substance, or person was 
scarcely distinguishable from the meanings of other frequently 
used Greek words such as ousia,  physis and prosopon. The 
Latin Bible translated hypostasis with substantia, Tertullian 
with  origo and genitura. Later, in the 4th century, Marius 
Victorinus and Rufinus of Aquileia preferred the term 
subsistentia. The indiscriminate use of the word hypostasis in 
the many semantic contexts in which it can function led to 
prolonged and fierce theological debates” (Couliano  1992, 
Introduction). As we already pointed out, Descartes speaks of 
the two substances which, in a real union, compose the very 
being of man. He also calls them distinct sides or, using a term 
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Beyond all these issues, the idea that man has two 
natures in one and the same person, recalls the formula 
imposed at the Council of Chalcedon (451A.D.): Christ is one 
being in two natures (en dyo physeis), concurring in one person 
and one hypostasis (eis hen prosopon kai mian hypostasin). It 
was natural, in fact, for man’s ontological status to be modelled 
on the Christological one, preserving the same paradox of the 
two natures.  
 
7. Conclusions. Competing interpretations and 
favoured ideologies  
  
  As has been shown above, the idea of the separation of 
the soul from the body did not originate with Descartes. It was 
formulated much earlier, and repeated by a disciple of 
Descartes’, namely Henry Leroy, known as Regius. When 
Descartes became aware of this bizarre interpretation he was 
dismayed and sought to clarify the matter. In various letters to 
friends and contacts, and in his metaphysical writings, 
Descartes regularly examined the issue and provided evidence. 
He sought to distinguish between two terms, “distinction” and 
“separation”, then to review the relationship between the body 
and the soul at three different levels, i.e. ordinary experience, 
analytical mind and metaphysical meditation. Eventually, he 
embraced the paradox of the two natures – the double 
substantial make-up of the human being, a paradox of patristic 
inspiration. 
However, the later history of ideas was not sympathetic 
to Descartes: nowadays, when one looks up the term 
“metaphysical dualism” in dictionaries or glossaries, even in the 
studies of prestigious researchers, they will find views similar 
to those of the unfaithful disciple Regius. This is precisely the 
common and official approach on this matter. It is explained, to 
a certain extent, by the new manner of interpreting 
metaphysical discourse: generally according to scientific 
theories, therefore as a technical or literal analysis of discourse. 
It is also explained by the special privilege of the reader’s 
intention, which easily obscures the two other instances in 
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Thus something very peculiar occurs in the interpretation of 
authors whom we call classics. They may end up as lab 
subjects, on which the most bizarre interpretations are tested. 
It barely matters how they responded for what they believed in, 
thought and written in their lifetime. What counts is the thesis 
promoted casually and vociferously by some interpreter.  
Descartes made a truly impressive effort to reject the 
accusation made brought against him that he supported a 
radical form of dualism. Considering this effort, we realise that 
the expression “Cartesian dualism” is indicative of a terrible 
locus obscurus in the philosophical tradition. Its emergence 
must be connected with establishment of certain modes of 
intersubjective life in the modern world. I think, above all, of 
the expansion of academic and scholarly communication, 
especially beginning with the 17th century. This development 
was related to the interpretation imposed by the natural 
sciences, physics and astronomy, mechanics, biology, etc. Such 
interpretation had erudite and naturalistic roots, emphasizing 
the technical meaning of texts and the possibility of verifying 
them logically and empirically. I will not go into greater detail, 
as these aspects are well known. I will add however that based 
on this reading, metaphysical texts can appear to be impossible 
to decide or perfectly contradictory (as has been said on the idea 
of the unity of two distinct substances in the real being of man). 
The intellectual environment became ever more sceptical – or 
perhaps more selective – as regards the concrete act of 
knowledge (which Descartes himself acknowledged in the 
foreword to Meditationes de prima philosophia). In fact it is not 
scepticism proper, on the one hand, or explicit atheism, on the 
other, that conquered the minds of the people Descartes refers 
to. Rather, they were undecided and actually did not know 
what to believe in. Consequently, they preferred to search for 
“unquestionable proof”, “diverse evidence” and “certain 
demonstrations”, similar to those of geometry. The latter ended 
up becoming very prestigious, primarily in educated 
environments. As a result, people increasingly adopted a 
technical reading of scholarly and philosophical texts. The 
ideology which dominated such reading now accompanied the 
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already an effective and failsafe model of knowledge (of 
mathematical and naturalistic descent), a sure method and 
validation criteria, an adequate reading of knowledge. The 
debates which ensued – in the form of objections and replies – 
increasingly complied with this new epistemic ideology. 
Descartes did not condemn the new hermeneutic system, 
yet he was aware of its limitations. In a letter written as 
preface to Principles of Philosophy (addressed to Abbot Claude 
Picot, who translated the text into French), Descartes added “a 
word of advice as regards the method of reading this book” 
(Descartes 2000b, 227; Adam and Tannery IXb, 11). He aimed 
for a special reader – probably the ideal reader from his point of 
view – who would read the book four times. He would read it 
first as a novel “without forcing one’s attention unduly upon it”. 
Then, he could read it a second time “in order to notice the 
sequence of my reasoning” and know the principles presented in 
the book. Finally, the reader could take up the book for a third 
or fourth time to find solutions to any difficulties encountered 
earlier. One can easily see that Descartes attached great 
importance to metaphysical reading, which directs attention to 
the idea of the “principles of knowledge”. He then referred to 
the “order that should be followed in our self-instruction” what 
is useful in life. To those who only have “the common and 
imperfect knowledge”, he recommended that they achieve a 
moral code “sufficient to regulate the actions of his life”; then 
they must take up logic (“that teaches us how best to direct our 
reason in order to discover those truths of which we are 
ignorant”); finally, they must study “the true philosophy, the 
first part of which is metaphysics, containing the principles of 
knowledge, among which is the explanation of the principal 
attributes of God, the immateriality of our souls, and all the 
clear and simple notions that are in us.” (Descartes 2000b, 228; 
Adam and Tannery IXb, 14). He compared this metaphysics to 
the roots of an arbor scientiarum, a symbol of all human 
knowledge. This is, then, how Descartes intended the reading 
and understanding of this writings. 
However, during his life, the public favoured another 
type of reading, apparently more effective and convincing due to 
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naturalistic to be exact, focused on the literal or technical 
meaning of texts.  
Subsequently, this type of reading itself was replaced by 
other radical forms, related to the new political and social 
changes of the modern world. They would be accompanied by 
new ideologies, different from those Descartes was familiar 
with. The ideology-orientated reading is easy to spot when the 
interpretation is dependent on the interests of groups of people 
and the beliefs that emerge in their practical world (Paul 
Ricoeur). The phrase itself has already been accepted by 
researchers who have followed in the footsteps of Karl 
Mannheim (Jameson 1981; Ducrot & Schaeffer 1995, chap. I, § 
9; Afloroaei 2002). Our understanding is often dependent on 
power plays and group strategies, however bizarre they might 
be at a given moment. The mind is constantly attacked – to a 
greater or lesser degree – by the force of ideologies. As a matter 
of fact, certain ideologies seek to change people’s way of 
thinking and expressing themselves. They can easily generate 
violence and censorship and bondage, as has often happened. 
On the other hand, our era has afforded us a new privilege, that 
of the reader’s position (intentio lectoris)7. It has led to the 
outburst of most eccentric readings, against the backdrop of 
collective reflexes, which can be easily observed in the world of 
scholarly communication. This means that inadequate readings 
can occur in any medium of intersubjective life. The “natural 
attitude”, so commonly debated in phenomenology, can be 
easily replaced by any privileged ideology. 
Indeed, the force of collective reflexes, which resemble the 
unconscious reflexes, is immense. It demands, as we are before 
new pages or challenging issues, to follow in the footsteps of 
many others before us. On this common path, already travelled 
by countless anonyms of ideas, concerns may seem to be lesser 
and easier to confront. In the meantime, they stop being 
perceived as such, as the road is well known – and however 
long – it leads to the same “safe place”. “Metaphysical dualism”, 
as attributed to Descartes and his posterity, has been such a 
place for the culture of the last four centuries. 
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NOTES 
 
 
1 Notorious in this respect are Alfred Jules Ayer’s “condescending” claims 
which he made in the opening pages of his book Logical Positivism, of 1958, 
where he states that the metaphysician of today should no longer be regarded 
as a criminal, as in the past, but simply as a troubled person. For more on this 
terrifying portrait of metaphysics, especially on the ideological heritage of 
Ludwig Feuerbach and Auguste Comte (cf. Afloroaei 2008, 160-174). 
2 Jean-Luc Marion’s effort to clarify certain intentions and themes of 
Cartesian thought is truly impressive. His books on Descartes include: Sur 
l’ontologie grise de Descartes. Science cartésienne et savoir aristotélicien, 1975; 
Index des Regulae ad directionem ingenii de René Descartes (en collab. avec 
J.-R. Armogathe), 1976; Sur la théologie blanche de Descartes, 1981; La 
passion de la  raison (Hommage à Ferdinand Alquié), en collab. avec J. 
Deprun, 1983; Sur la prisme métaphysique de Descartes, 1986; Le Discours et 
sa méthode (sous la direction de N. Grimaldi et J.-L. Marion), 1987; 
Questiones cartésiennes I. Méthode et métaphysique, 1991; Descartes. Objecter 
et répondre (en collab. avec J.-M. Beyssade), 1994; Questiones cartésiennes II. 
Sur l’ego et sur Dieu, 1996; Index des Meditationes de prima philosophia de 
René Descartes (en collaboration avec J.-P. Massonet, P. Monat et L. Ucciani), 
1996. 
3 Henricus Regius (Henry Leroy, 1598-1679) published in 1646, at 
Amsterdam, his work Fundamenta Physices, where chapter 12 (De homine) 
deals with the new view of man as “accidental being”. Other works: 
Fundamenta medica, 1647; Brevis explicatio mentis humanae, sive animae 
rationalis, 1647; De affectibus animi dissertatio, 1650; Philosophia naturalis, 
1654 (book V, titled De homine, is based on Fundamenta Physices, borrowing 
from Descartes’ Passions of the Soul).  
Descartes warned his readers (Les Principes de la Philosophie, Lettre à 
Claude Picot) about Regius’s habits in rendering some of his ideas: “because 
he had transcribed badly, changed the order, and denied certain truths of 
metaphysics upon which the whole of physics ought to rest, I am obliged 
entirely to disavow his work, and here to beg readers never to attribute to me 
any opinion unless they find it expressly stated in my works, and never to 
accept anything as true in my writings or elsewhere, unless they see it to be 
very clearly deduced from true Principles” (Descartes 2000 b, 230; Adam and 
Tannery IXb, 19-20). 
4 These functions are not understood exactly as in the scholastic tradition. 
Étienne Gilson in his Index scolastico-cartésien, refers to the distinct, yet not 
separate  anima rationalis, anima sensitiva, anima vegetativa, anima 
nutritiva şi anima locomotiva. He noted in this respect the influence of past 
authors, such as Thomas Aquinas (Summae Theol. I, 78, 1). Geneviève Rodis-
Lewis, in the introduction to a recent edition (1994) of The Passions of the 
Soui, considers that the soul-body distinction replaces the older ranking of the 
three powers of the soul, i.e. vegetative, sensitive and rational (article XLVII), 
while totally rejecting certain dualities accepted by other authors, such as 
concupiscence and anger (article LXVIII). 
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5 See in particular his response to Antoine Arnauld, the author of a fourth 
series of objections to Meditationes (Adam and Tannery VII, 227-228); the 
reply to Regius (Adam and Tannery III, 493); the clarifications included in a 
letter to Elisabeth, 21 May 1643 (Adam and Tannery VII, 664-665). 
6 Cf. Spinoza, Ethica, V, Preface. Leibniz issued rather stern retorts in: Brevis 
demonstratio erroris memorabilis Cartesii, 1686, Animadversiones in partem 
generalem Principiorum Cartesianorum, 1686, De primae philosophiae 
emendatione, et de notione substantiae, 1694, and other books. 
7 There are several well-known post-war scholarly works on this matter 
including: J. M. Castillet, La hora del lector, 1957; Mircea Eliade, L’Epreuve 
du Labyrinthe (entretiens avec Claude-Henri Rocquet), 1978; Paul Ricoeur, 
Du texte à l’action. Essais d’herméneutique, II, 1986; Tzvetan Todorov, Viaggio 
nella critica americana, 1987. Later, the issue was dealth with extensively by 
Umberto Eco, in I limiti dell’interpretazione, 1990, or in Interpretation and 
Overinterpretation. With Richard Rorty, Jonathan Culler and Christine 
Brooke-Rose, edited by Stefan Collini, 1995. 
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